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We argue that deterministic market clearing formulations introduce arbitrary distortions between day-ahead
and expected real-time prices that bias economic incentives and block diversification. We extend and analyze
the stochastic clearing formulation proposed by Pritchard et al. (2010) in which the social surplus function
induces penalties between day-ahead and real-time quantities. We prove that the formulation yields price
distortions that are bounded by the bid prices, and we show that adding a similar penalty term to trans-
mission flows and phase angles ensures boundedness throughout the network. We prove that when the price
distortions are zero, day-ahead quantities converge to the quantile of real-time counterparts. The undesired
effects of price distortions suggest that stochastic settings provide significant benefits over deterministic ones
that go beyond social surplus improvements. We propose additional metrics to evaluate these benefits.
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1. Introduction
Day-ahead markets enable commitment and pricing of resources to hedge against uncertainty in
demand, generation, and network capacities that are observed in real time. The day-ahead mar-
ket is cleared by independent system operators (ISOs) using deterministic unit commitment (UC)
formulations that rely on expected capacity forecasts, while uncertainty is handled by allocating
reserves that are used to balance the system if real-time capacities deviate from the forecasts. A
large number of deterministic clearing formulations have been proposed in the literature. Repre-
sentative examples include those of Carrio´n and Arroyo (2006), Gribik et al. (2011), and Hobbs
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(2001). Pricing issues arising in deterministic clearing formulations have been explored by Wang
et al. (2012), Galiana et al. (2003), and O’Neill et al. (2005).
In addition to guaranteeing reliability and maximizing social surplus, several metrics are mon-
itored by ISOs to ensure that the market operates efficiently. For instance, as is discussed in Ott
(2003), the ISO must ensure that market players receive economic incentives that promote par-
ticipation (give participants the incentive to follow commitment and dispatch signals). It is also
desired that day-ahead and real-time prices are sufficiently close or converge. One of the reasons is
that price convergence is an indication that capacity forecasts are effective reflections of real-time
capacities. Recent evidence provided by Bowden et al. (2009), however, has shown that persistent
and predictable deviations between day-ahead and real-time prices (premia) exist in certain mar-
kets. This can bias the incentives to a subset of players and block the entry of new players and
technologies. The introduction of purely financial players was intended to eliminate premia, but
recent evidence provided by Birge et al. (2013) shows that this has not been fully effective. One
hypothesis is that virtual players can exploit predictable price differences in the day-ahead market
to create artificial congestion and benefit from financial transmission rights (Joskow and Tirole
2000).
Prices are also monitored by ISOs to ensure that they do not run into financial deficit (a situa-
tion called revenue inadequacy) when balancing payments to suppliers and from consumers. This
is discussed in detail in Philpott and Pritchard (2004). In addition, ISOs might need to use uplift
payments and adjust prices to protect suppliers from operating at an economic loss. This is neces-
sary to prevent players from leaving the market. As discussed by O’Neill et al. (2005), Morales et al.
(2012), and Wang et al. (2012); uplift payments can result from using incomplete characterizations
of the system in the clearing model. Such characterizations can arise, for instance, in the presence
of nonconvexities and stochasticity.
Achieving efficient market operations under intermittent renewable generation is a challenge for
the ISOs because uncertainty follows complex spatiotemporal patterns not faced before (Constan-
tinescu et al. (2011)). In addition, the power grid is relying more strongly on natural gas and
transportation infrastructures, and it is thus necessary to quantify and mitigate uncertainty in
more systematic ways (Liu et al. (2009), Zavala (2014)).
1.1. Previous Work
A wide range of stochastic formulations of day-ahead market clearing and operational UC proce-
dures has been previously proposed. In operational UC models, on/off decisions are made in advance
(here-and-now) to ensure that enough running capacity is available at future times to balance
the system. The objective of these formulations is to ensure reliability and maximization of social
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surplus (cost in case of inelastic demands) in intra-day operations. Examples include the works of
Takriti et al. (1996), Wang et al. (2008), Constantinescu et al. (2011), Jin et al. (2014), Ruiz et al.
(2009), Bouffard et al. (2005), Papavasiliou and Oren (2013). These studies have demonstrated
significant improvements in reliability over deterministic formulations. However, these works do
not explore pricing issues.
Stochastic day-ahead clearing formulations have been proposed by Kaye et al. (1990) and Wong
and Fuller (2007). Kaye et al. (1990) analyse day-ahead and real-time markets under uncertainty
and argue that day-ahead prices should be set to expected values of the real-time prices. This
price consistency ensures that the day-ahead market does not bias real-time market incentives in
the long run. Such consistency also avoids arbitrage as is argued by Khazaei et al. (2013).Wong
and Fuller (2007) propose pricing schemes to achieve cost recovery for all suppliers (i.e., payments
cover the suppliers production costs). The pricing schemes, however, rely only partially on dual
variables generated by the stochastic clearing model which are adjusted to achieve cost recovery.
Consequently, these procedures do not guarantee dual and model consistency.
Morales et al. (2012) propose a stochastic clearing model to price electricity in pools with stochas-
tic producers. Their model co-optimizes energy and reserves and they prove that it leads to revenue
adequacy in expectation. In addition, they prove that prices allow for cost recovery in expectation
for all players (i.e., no uplifts are needed in expectation) but pricing consistency is not explored.
Pritchard et al. (2010) propose a stochastic formulation that captures day-ahead and real-time
bidding of both suppliers and consumers. The formulation maximizes the day-ahead social surplus
and the expected value of the real-time corrections by considering the possibility of players’ bidding
in the real-time market. The authors prove that the formulation leads to revenue adequacy in
expectation and provide conditions under which adequacy will hold for each scenario. The authors
do not explore pricing consistency and economic incentives.
Khazaei et al. (2013) propose a stochastic equilibrium formulation in which players bid param-
eters of a quadratic supply function to maximize the expected value of their profit function while
the ISO uses these parameters to solve the clearing model and generate day-ahead and real-time
quantities and prices. It is shown that the equilibrium model generates day-ahead prices that
converge to expected value prices and thus achieve consistency. It is also shown that day-ahead
quantities converge to expected value quantities and a small case study is presented to demonstrate
that the formulation yields higher social surplus and producer profits compared to deterministic
clearing. The proposed formulation uses a quadratic supply function and quadratic penalties for
deviations between day-ahead and real-time quantities. No network and no capacity constraints
are considered.
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Morales et al. (2014) propose a bilevel stochastic optimization formulation that uses forecast
capacities of stochastic suppliers as degrees of freedom. Using computational studies, they demon-
strate that their framework provides cost recovery for all suppliers and for each scenario. The
authors, however, do not discuss the effects of the modified pricing strategy on consumer payments
(the demands are treated as inelastic) and no theoretical guarantees are provided. In particular, it
is not guaranteed that a set of day-ahead capacities and prices exist that can achieve cost recovery
for both suppliers and consumers in each scenario. While plausible, we believe that this requires
further evidence and theoretical justification.
1.2. Contributions of This Work
In this work, we argue that deterministic formulations generate day-ahead prices that are distorted
representations of expected real-time prices. This pricing inconsistency arises because solving a day-
head clearing model using summarizing statistics of uncertain capacities (e.g., expected forecasts)
does not lead to day-ahead prices that are expected values of the real-time prices. We argue that
these price distortions lead to diverse issues such as the need of uplift payments as well as arbitrary
and biased incentives that block diversification. We extend and analyze the stochastic clearing
formulation of Pritchard et al. (2010) in which linear supply functions for day-ahead and real-time
markets are used. The structure of this surplus function has the key property that yields bounded
price distortions. We also prove that when the price distortion is zero, the formulation yields day-
ahead quantities that converge to the quantile of their real-time counterparts. In addition, we prove
that the formulation yields revenue adequacy in expectation and yields zero uplifts in expectation.
We provide several case studies to demonstrate the properties of the stochastic formulation.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we describe the market setting. In Section 3 we
present deterministic and stochastic formulations of the day-ahead ISO clearing problem. In Section
4 we present a set of performance metrics to assess the benefits of the stochastic formulation over
its deterministic counterpart. In Section 5 we present the pricing properties of the formulation.
In Section 6 we present case studies to demonstrate the developments. Concluding remarks and
directions of future work are provided in Section 7.
2. Market Setting
We consider a market setting based on the work of Pritchard et al. (2010) and Ott (2003). A set of
suppliers (generators) G and consumers (demands) D bid into the day-ahead market by providing
price bids αgi ≥ 0, i ∈ G and αdj ≥ 0, j ∈ D, respectively. If a given demand is inelastic, we set the
bid price to αdj = V OLL where V OLL denotes the value of lost load, typically 1,000 $/MWh.
Suppliers and consumers also provide estimates of the available capacities g¯i and d¯j, respectively.
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We assume that these capacities satisfy 0≤ g¯i ≤ Capgi and 0≤ d¯j ≤ Capdj where 0≤ Capgi <+∞
is the total installed capacity of the supplier (its maximum possible supply) and 0≤Capdi <+∞
is the total installed capacity of the consumer (its maximum possible demand). The cleared day-
ahead quantities for suppliers and consumers are given by gi and dj, respectively. These satisfy
0≤ gi ≤ g¯i and 0≤ dj ≤ d¯j.
Suppliers and consumers are connected through a network comprising of a set of lines L and a
set of nodes N . For each line `∈L we define its sending node as snd(`)∈N and its receiving node
as rec(`) ∈N (we highlight that this definition of sending node is arbitrary because the flow can
go in both directions). For each node n∈N , we define its set of receiving lines as Lrecn ⊆L and its
set of sending lines as Lsndn ⊆L. These sets are given by
Lrecn = {`∈L|n= rec(`)}, n∈N (1a)
Lsndn = {`∈L|n= snd(`)}, n∈N . (1b)
Day-ahead capacities f¯` are also typically estimated for the transmission lines. We assume that
these satisfy 0≤ f¯` ≤ Capf` . Here, 0≤ Capf` <+∞ is the installed capacity of line (its maximum
possible value). The cleared day-ahead flows are given by f` such that −f¯` ≤ f` ≤ f¯`. The flows f`
are determined by the line susceptance B` and the phase angle difference between two nodes of the
line. Day-ahead capacities θn, θ¯n are estimated for each node n∈N . The cleared day-ahead phase
angles are given by θn such that θn ≤ θn ≤ θ¯n for n∈N . We define the set of all suppliers connected
to node n ∈N as Gn ⊆ G and the set of demands connected to node n as Dn ⊆D. Subindex n(i)
indicates the node at which supplier i ∈ G is connected, and n(j) indicates the node at which the
demand j ∈D is connected. We use subindex i exclusively for suppliers and subindex j exclusively
for consumers.
At the moment the day-ahead market is cleared, the real-time market conditions are uncertain.
In particular, we assume that a subset of generation, demand, and transmission line capacities are
uncertain. We further assume that discrete distributions comprising a finite set of scenarios Ω and
p(ω) denote the probability of scenario ω ∈Ω. We also require that ∑ω∈Ω p(ω) = 1. The expected
value of variable Y (·) is given by E[Y (ω)] =∑ω∈Ω p(ω)Y (ω). If Y (ω) is scalar-valued, the quantile
function Q is defined as
QY (ω)(p) := inf {y ∈R : P(Y (ω)≤ y)≥ p} . (2)
Moreover, the median is denoted as M[Y (ω)] =QY (ω)(0.5) and satisfies
M[Y (ω)] = argmin
m
E[|Y (ω)−m|], (3)
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where | · | is the absolute value function.
In the real-time market, the suppliers can offer to sell additional generation over the agreed day-
ahead quantities at a bid price αg,+i ≥ 0. The additional generation is given by (Gi(ω)−gi)+ where
Gi(ω) is the cleared quantity in the real-time market and 0≤ G¯i(ω)≤Capgi is the realized capacity
under scenario ω ∈ Ω. Real-time generation quantities are bounded as 0 ≤ Gi(ω) ≤ G¯i(ω). Here,
(X −x)+ := max{X −x,0}. The suppliers also have the option of buying electricity at an offering
price αg,−i ≥ 0 to account for any uncovered generation (Gi(ω)− gi)− over the agreed day-ahead
quantities. Here, (X −x)− = max{−(X −x),0}.
Consumers provide bid prices αd,−j ≥ 0 to buy additional demand (Dj(ω)−dj)+ in the real-time
market, where Dj(ω) is the cleared quantity and 0≤ D¯j(ω)≤Capdj is the available demand capacity
realized under scenario ω ∈Ω. We thus have 0≤Dj(ω)≤ D¯j(ω). Consumers also have the option
of selling the demand deficit (Dj(ω)− dj)− at price αd,+j ≥ 0.
The flows cleared in the real-time market are given by F`(ω) and satisfy −F¯`(ω)≤ F`(ω)≤ F¯`(ω).
Here, F¯`(ω) is the transmission line capacity realized under scenario ω ∈Ω and satisfies −Capf` ≤
F¯`(ω)≤Capf` . Uncertain line capacities can be used to model N −x contingencies or uncertainties
in capacity due to ambient conditions (e.g., ambient temperature affects line capacity). The cleared
phase angles in the real-time market are given by Θn(ω) such that θn ≤Θn(ω)≤ θ¯n for n∈N .
We also define day-ahead clearing prices (i.e., locational marginal prices) for each node n ∈ N
as pin. The real-time prices are defined as Πn(ω), ω ∈Ω.
3. Clearing Formulations
In this section, we present energy-only day-ahead deterministic and stochastic clearing formulations.
The term “energy-only” indicates that no unit commitment decisions are made. We consider these
simplified formulations in order to focus on important concepts related to pricing and payments
to suppliers and consumers. Model extensions are left as a topic of future research.
3.1. Deterministic Formulation
In a deterministic setting, the day-ahead market is cleared by solving the following optimization
problem.
min
dj ,gi,f`,θn
∑
i∈G
αgi gi−
∑
j∈D
αdjdj (4a)
s.t.
∑
`∈Lrecn
f`−
∑
`∈Lsndn
f` +
∑
i∈Gn
gi−
∑
i∈Dn
di = 0, (pin) n∈N (4b)
f` =B`(θrec(`)− θsnd(`)), `∈L (4c)
− f¯` ≤ f` ≤ f¯`, `∈L (4d)
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0≤ gi ≤ g¯i, i∈ G (4e)
0≤ dj ≤ d¯j, j ∈D (4f)
θn ≤ θn ≤ θn, n∈N . (4g)
The objective function of this problem is the day-ahead negative social surplus. The solution of
this problem gives the day-ahead quantities gi, dj, flows f`, phase angles θn, and prices pin. The
deterministic formulation assumes a given value for the capacities g¯i, d¯j, f¯`, θn, and θn. Because the
conditions of the real-time market are uncertain at the time the day-ahead problem (4) is solved,
these capacities are typically assumed to be the most probable ones (e.g., the expected value or
forecast for supply and demand capacities) or are set based on the current state of the system (e.g.,
for line capacities and phase angle ranges). In particular, it is usually assumed that g¯i =E[G¯i(ω)],
d¯j =E[D¯j(ω)], and f¯` is the most probable state. One can also assume that g¯i =Capgi and d¯j =Capdj ,
and f¯` =Cap
f
` . Such an assumption, however, can yield high economic penalties if the day-ahead
dispatched quantities are far from those realized in the real-time market. Similarly, one can also
assume conservative capacities (e.g., worst-case). In this sense, the day-ahead capacities g¯i, d¯j, f¯`
can be used as mechanisms to hedge against risk, as experienced ISO operators do to allow for a
safety margin. Doing so, however, gives only limited control because the players need to summarize
the entire possible range of real-time capacities in one statistic. In Section 4 we argue that this
limitation can induce a distortion between day-ahead and real-time prices and biases revenues.
When the capacities become known, the ISO uses fixed day-ahead committed quantities
gi, dj, f`, θn, to solve the following real-time clearing problem.
min
Dj(·),Gi(·),F`(·),Θn(·)
∑
i∈G
(
αg,+i (Gi(ω)− gi)+−αg,−i (Gi(ω)− gi)−
)
(5a)
+
∑
j∈D
(
αd,+j (Dj(ω)− dj)−−αd,−j (Dj(ω)− dj)+
)
(5b)
s.t.
∑
`∈Lrecn
F`(ω)−
∑
`∈Lsndn
F`(ω) +
∑
i∈Gn
Gi(ω)−
∑
j∈Dn
Dj(ω) = 0, (Πn(ω)), n∈N
(5c)
F`(ω) =B`(Θrec(`)(ω)−Θsnd(`)(ω)), n∈N (5d)
− F¯`(ω)≤ F`(ω)≤ F¯`(ω), `∈L (5e)
0≤Gi(ω)≤ G¯i(ω), i∈ G (5f)
0≤Dj(ω)≤ D¯j(ω), j ∈D (5g)
θn ≤Θn(ω)≤ θn, n∈N . (5h)
The objective function of this problem is the real-time negative social surplus. The solution of this
problem yields different real-time quantities Gi(ω),Dj(ω), flows F`(ω), phase angles Θn(ω), and
prices Πn(ω) depending on the scenario ω ∈Ω realized.
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3.2. Stochastic Formulation
Motivated by the structure of the day-ahead and real-time market problems, we consider the
stochastic market clearing formulation:
min
dj ,Dj(·),gi,Gi(·),f`,F`(·),θn,Θn(·)
ϕsto :=
∑
i∈G
E
[
αgi gi +α
g,+
i (Gi(ω)− gi)+−αg,−i (Gi(ω)− gi)−
]
+
∑
j∈D
E
[−αdjdj +αd,+j (Dj(ω)− dj)−−αd,−j (Dj(ω)− dj)+]
+
∑
`∈L
E
[
∆αf,+` (F`(ω)− f`)+ + ∆αf,−` (F`(ω)− f`)−
]
+
∑
n∈N
E
[
∆αθ,+n (Θn(ω)− θn)+ + ∆αθ,−n (Θn(ω)− θn)−
]
(6a)
s.t.
∑
`∈Lrecn
f`−
∑
`∈Lsndn
f` +
∑
i∈Gn
gi−
∑
i∈Dn
di = 0, (pin) n∈N (6b)
f` =B`(θrec(`)− θsnd(`)), `∈L (6c)∑
`∈Lrecn
(F`(ω)− f`)−
∑
`∈Lsndn
(F`(ω)− f`) +
∑
i∈Gn
(Gi(ω)− gi)
−
∑
j∈Dn
(Dj(ω)− dj) = 0, (p(ω)Πn(ω)) ω ∈Ω, n∈N (6d)
F`(ω) =B`(Θrec(`)(ω)−Θsnd(`)(ω)), ω ∈Ω, `∈L (6e)
− F¯`(ω)≤ F`(ω)≤ F¯`(ω), ω ∈Ω, `∈L (6f)
0≤Gi(ω)≤ G¯i(ω), ω ∈Ω, i∈ G (6g)
0≤Dj(ω)≤ D¯j(ω), ω ∈Ω, j ∈D (6h)
θn ≤Θn(ω)≤ θn, ω ∈Ω, n∈N . (6i)
The stochastic setting provides a natural mechanism to anticipate the effects of day-ahead deci-
sions on real-time market corrections. This property gives rise to several important pricing and
payment properties, as we will see in the following section.
The above formulation is partially based on the one proposed by Pritchard et al. (2010). We
highlight the following features of the model:
• The real-time prices (duals of the network balance (6d)) have been weighted by their cor-
responding probabilities. This feature will enable us to construct the Lagrange function of the
problem in terms of expectations.
• The network balance in the real-time market is written in terms of the residual quantities
(Gi(ω)− gi), (Dj(ω)− dj), and flows (F`(ω)− f`). This feature will be key in obtaining consistent
prices and it emphasizes the fact that the real-time market is a market of corrections.
• We assume that the real-time quantity bounds G¯i(ω), D¯j(ω), F¯`(ω) are independent of the
day-ahead quantities.
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The differences between the proposed formulation and the one presented by Pritchard et al.
(2010) are the following.
• The formulation does not impose bounds on the day-ahead quantities, flows and phase angles.
In Section 5 we will prove that the penalization terms render bounds for the day-ahead quantities,
flows and phase angles redundant (see Theorem 7).
• The parameters ∆αf,+` ,∆αf,−` ,∆αθ,+,∆αθ,− > 0 penalize deviations between day-ahead and
real-time quantities. In Section 4 we will see that these penalties are motivated by the structure
of the social surplus and in Section 5 we will show that they are key to ensure desirable pricing
properties.
• We allow for randomness in the transmission line capacities. In Section 5 we will see that doing
so has no effect on the underlying properties of the model.
• We assume that the stochastic problem has relative complete recourse. That is, there exist a
feasible real-time recourse decision for any day-ahead decision.
We refer to the solution of the stochastic formulation (6) as the here-and-now solution to reflect
the fact that a single implementable decision must be made now in anticipation of the uncertain
future and that day-ahead quantities and flows are scenario-independent. We also consider the
(ideal, non-implementable) wait-and-see (WS) solution. For details, refer to Birge and Louveaux
(1997). In the WS setting, we assume that the capacities for each scenario are actually known at
the moment of decision. In other words, we assume availability of perfect information. In order to
obtain the WS solution, the clearing problem (6) is solved by allowing first-stage decisions gi, dj, f`
to be scenario-dependent. It is not difficult to prove that in this case, each scenario generates
day-ahead prices and quantities that are equal to real-time counterparts because no corrections
are necessary. We denote the expected social surplus obtained under perfect information as ϕstoWS.
4. ISO Performance Metrics for Market Clearing
In this section, we discuss some objectives of the ISOs from a market operations standpoint and
use these to motivate a new set of metrics to quantify performance of deterministic and stochastic
formulations. We place special emphasis on the structure of the social surplus function and on the
issue of price consistency. We provide arguments as to why price consistency is a key property in
achieving incentives. We argue that deterministic formulations do not actually yield price consis-
tency and hence result in a range of undesired effects such as biased payments, revenue inadequacy,
and the need for uplifts.
We highlight that we define different metrics based on market behavior in expectation. A practical
way of interpreting these expected metrics is the following: assume that the market conditions
of a given day are repeated over a sequence of days and we collect the results over such period
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by using each day as a scenario. We then compute a certain metric (like the social welfare) to
perform the comparisons between the stochastic and deterministic clearing mechanisms to evaluate
performance. In this sense, market behavior in expectation can also interpreted as long run market
behavior.
4.1. Social Surplus
Consider the combination of the day-ahead and real-time costs for suppliers and consumers,
Cgi (ω) = +α
g
i gi +α
g,+
i (Gi(ω)− gi)+−αg,−i (Gi(ω)− gi)− (7a)
Cdj (ω) =−αdjdj +αd,+j (Dj(ω)− dj)−−αd,−j (Dj(ω)− dj)+. (7b)
We define the incremental bid prices as ∆αg,+i := α
g,+
i −αgi , ∆αg,−i := αgi −αg,−i , ∆αd,+j := αd,+j −αdj
and ∆αd,−j := α
d
j−αd,−j . To avoid degeneracy, we require that the incremental bid prices are positive:
∆αg,+i ,∆α
g,−
i ,∆α
d,+
j ,∆α
d,−
j > 0
Theorem 1. Assume that the incremental bid prices are positive. The cost functions for suppliers
and consumers can be expressed as
Cgi (ω) = α
g
iGi(ω) + ∆α
g,+
i (Gi(ω)− gi)+ + ∆αg,−i (Gi(ω)− gi)−, i∈ G, ω ∈Ω (8a)
Cdj (ω) =−αdjDj(ω) + ∆αd,+j (Dj(ω)− dj)−+ ∆αd,−j (Dj(ω)− dj)+, j ∈D, ω ∈Ω. (8b)
Proof Consider the cost function for suppliers
Cgi (ω) = α
g
i gi +α
g,+
i (Gi(ω)− gi)+−αg,−i (Gi(ω)− gi)−
= αgi gi + (α
g
i + ∆α
g,+
i )(Gi(ω)− gi)+− (αgi −∆αg,−i )(Gi(ω)− gi)−
= αgi gi +α
g
i (Gi(ω)− gi)+−αgi (Gi(ω)− gi)−+ ∆αg,+i (Gi(ω)− gi)+ + ∆αg,−i (Gi(ω)− gi)−
= αgi gi +α
g
i (Gi(ω)− gi) + ∆αg,+i (Gi(ω)− gi)+ + ∆αg,−i (Gi(ω)− gi)−
= αgiGi(ω) + ∆α
g,+
i (Gi(ω)− gi)+ + ∆αg,−i (Gi(ω)− gi)−.
The last two equalities follow from the fact that X−x= (X−x)+− (X−x)−. The same property
applies to Cdj (ω) (using the appropriate cost terms). 
We say that the incremental bid prices are symmetric if ∆αg,+i = ∆α
g,−
i and ∆α
d,+
j = ∆α
d,−
j .
Denote the symmetric prices by ∆αgi := ∆α
g,+
i = ∆α
g,−
i and ∆α
d
j := ∆α
d,+
j = ∆α
d,−
j .
Corollary 1. If the incremental bid prices are symmetric, then the cost functions for suppliers
and consumers can be expressed as
Cgi (ω) = α
g
iGi(ω) + ∆α
g
i |Gi(ω)− gi|, i∈ G, ω ∈Ω (9a)
Cdj (ω) =−αdjDj(ω) + ∆αdj |Dj(ω)− dj|, j ∈D, ω ∈Ω. (9b)
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Proof Consider the cost function for suppliers
Cgi (ω) = α
g
iGi(ω) + ∆α
g,
i (Gi(ω)− gi)+ + ∆αg,i (Gi(ω)− gi)−
= αgiGi(ω) + ∆α
g
i |Gi(ω)− gi|,
because of the fact that |X−x|= (X−x)+ +(X−x)−. The same property applies to Cdj (ω) (using
the appropriate cost terms). 
Definition 1 (Social Surplus). We define the expected negative social surplus (or social surplus
for short) as
ϕ :=E
[∑
i∈G
Cgi (ω) +
∑
j∈D
Cdj (ω)
]
=ϕg +ϕd, (10)
where ϕg,ϕd are the expected supply and consumer costs,
ϕg :=E
[∑
i∈G
Cgi (ω)
]
=
∑
i∈G
(
αgiE[Gi(ω)] + ∆α
g,+
i E[(Gi(ω)− gi)+] + ∆αg,−i E[(Gi(ω)− gi)−]
)
(11a)
ϕd :=E
[∑
j∈D
Cdj (ω)
]
=
∑
j∈D
(−αdjE[Dj(ω)] + ∆αd,+j E [(Dj(ω)− dj)−] + ∆αd,−j E [(Dj(ω)− dj)+]) . (11b)
This particular structure of the expected social surplus function was noticed by Pritchard et al.
(2010) and provides interesting insights. From Equation (11), we note that the expected quan-
tities E[Gi(ω)], E[Dj(ω)] act as forecasts of the day-ahead quantities and are priced by using
the day-ahead bids αgi , α
j
d (first term). This immediately suggests that it is the expected cleared
quantities Gi(ω),Dj(ω) and not the capacities g¯i, d¯j that are to be used as forecasts, as is done
in the day-ahead deterministic formulation (4). The second and third terms penalize deviations
of the real-time quantities from the day-ahead commitments using the incremental bid prices.
More interestingly, Corollary 1 suggests that when the incremental bid prices are symmetric (i.e.,
∆αg,+i = ∆α
g,−
i and ∆α
d,+
j = ∆α
d,−
j ), day-ahead quantities will tend to converge to the median
of the real-time quantities if the expected social surplus function is minimized. A deterministic
setting, however, cannot guarantee optimality in this sense because it minimizes the day-ahead and
real-time components of the surplus function separately. In particular, the expected social surplus
for the deterministic formulation is obtained by solving the day-ahead problem (4) followed by
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the solution of the real-time problem (5) for all scenarios ω ∈ Ω. The day-ahead surplus and the
expected value of the real-time surplus are then combined to obtain the expected surplus ϕ.
A deterministic setting can yield surplus inefficiencies because it cannot properly anticipate the
effect of day-ahead decision on real-time market decisions. For instance, certain suppliers can be
inflexible in the sense that they cannot modify their day-ahead supply easily in the real-time mar-
ket (e.g., coal plants). This results in constraints of the form gi =Gi(ω) or dj =Dj(ω), ω ∈Ω. This
inflexibility can trigger inefficiencies because the operator is forced to use expensive units in the
real-time market (e.g., combined-cycle) or because load shedding is needed to prevent infeasibilities.
Most studies on stochastic market clearing and unit commitment have focused on showing improve-
ments in social surplus over deterministic formulations. In Section 6 we demonstrate that even
when social surplus differences are negligible, the resulting prices and payments can be drastically
different. This situation motivates us to consider alternative metrics for monitoring performance.
We note that the objective function of the stochastic clearing formulation (6) can be written as
ϕsto =ϕ+
∑
`∈L
E
[
∆αf,+` (F`(ω)− f`)+ + ∆αf,−` (F`(ω)− f`)−
]
+
∑
n∈N
E
[
∆αθ,+n (Θn(ω)− θn)+ + ∆αθ,−n (Θn(ω)− θn)−
]
, (12)
where ϕ is the expected negative surplus function defined in (10). Consequently, if
∆αf,+` ,∆α
f,−
` ,∆α
θ,+,∆αθ,− are sufficiently small, we have that ϕsto ≈ϕ.
4.2. Pricing Consistency
We seek that the day-ahead prices be consistent representations of the expected real-time prices.
In other words, we seek that the expected price distortions (also known as expected price premia)
pin −E[Πn(ω)], n ∈ N be zero or at least in a bounded neighborhood. This is desired for various
reasons that we will explain.
Definition 2 (Price Distortions). We define the expected price distortion or expected price
premia as
Mpin := pin−E [Πn(ω)] , n∈N . (13)
We say that the price is consistent at node n ∈ N if Mpin = 0. In addition, we define the node
average and maximum absolute distortions,
Mpiavg :=
1
|N |
∑
n∈N
|Mpin| (14a)
Mpimax := max
n∈N
|Mpin|. (14b)
Zavala, Kim, Anitescu, and Birge: Stochastic Market Clearing with Consistent Pricing
Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no. 13
Pricing consistency is related to the desire that day-ahead and real-time prices converge, as is
discussed by Ott (2003). Note, however, that it is unrealistic to expect that day-ahead and real-
time prices converge in each scenario. This is possible only in the absence of uncertainty (capacity
forecasts are perfect such as in the perfect information setting). Any real-time deviation in capacity
from a day-ahead forecast will lead to a deviation between day-ahead and real-time prices. It
is possible, however, to ensure that day-ahead and real-time prices converge in expectation. This
situation also implies that any deviation of the real-time price from the day-ahead price is entirely
the result of unpredictable random factors. This is also equivalent to saying that day-ahead prices
converge to the expected value of the real-time prices.
Pricing consistency cannot be guaranteed with deterministic formulations because the day-ahead
clearing model forecasts real-time capacities, not real-time quantities. Consequently, players are
forced to “summarize” their possible real-time capacities in single statistics d¯j, g¯i, f¯`. Expected val-
ues are typically used. This summarization, however, is inconsistent because it does not effectively
average real-time market performance as the structure of the surplus function (11) suggests. In
fact, as we show in Section 5, expected values need not be the right statistic to use in the day-ahead
market. This is consistent with the observations made by Morales et al. (2014). In addition, we
note that certain random variables might be difficult to summarize (e.g., if they follow multimodal
and heavy-tailed distributions). For instance, consider that there is uncertainty about the state
of a transmission line in the real-time market (i.e., there is a probability that it will fail). In a
deterministic setting it is difficult to come up with a ”forecast” value for the day-ahead capacity
f¯` in such a case.
4.3. Suppliers and Consumer Payments
As argued by Kaye et al. (1990), we can justify the desire of seeking price consistency by analyzing
the payments to the market players. The payment includes the day-ahead settlement plus the
correction payment given at real-time prices, as is the standard practice in market operations. For
more details, see Ott (2003) and Pritchard et al. (2010).
Definition 3 (Payments). The payments to suppliers and from consumers in scenario ω ∈Ω are
defined as follows:
P gi (ω) := gipin(i) + (Gi(ω)− gi)Πn(i)(ω)
= gi(pin(i)−Πn(i)(ω)) +Gi(ω)Πn(i)(ω), i∈ G, ω ∈Ω (15a)
P dj (ω) :=−djpin(i)− (Dj(ω)− dj)Πn(j)(ω)
= dj(Πn(i)(ω)−pin(i))−Dj(ω)Πn(j)(ω), j ∈D, ω ∈Ω. (15b)
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We say that the expected payments are consistent if they satisfy
E [P gi (ω)] = +E
[
Gi(ω)Πn(i)(ω)
]
, i∈ G (16a)
E
[
P dj (ω)
]
=−E [Dj(ω)Πn(j)(ω)] , j ∈D, (16b)
where
E [P gi (ω)] = +giMpin(i) +E
[
Gi(ω)Πn(i)(ω)
]
, i∈ G (17a)
E
[
P dj (ω)
]
=−djMpin(j)−E
[
Dj(ω)Πn(j)(ω)
]
, j ∈D. (17b)
If the prices are consistent at each node n ∈ N , the expected payments are consistent. This
definition of consistency is motivated by the following observations. The price distortion is factored
in the expected payments. From (17) we see that price distortions (premia) can bias benefits
toward a subset of players. In particular, if the premium at a given node is negative (Mpin < 0),
a supplier will not benefit from the day-ahead market but a consumer will. This situation can
prevent suppliers from participating in day-ahead market. IfMpin > 0, the oppostive holds true. This
situation can prevent consumers from providing price-responsive demands. We can thus conclude
that price consistency ensures payment consistency with respect to suppliers and consumers. In
other words, Mpin = 0 implies (16).
Kaye et al. (1990) argue that setting the day-ahead prices to the expected real-time prices (price
consistency) is desirable because it effectively eliminates the day-ahead component of the market.
Consequently, the market operates (in expectation) as a pure real-time market. This situation
is desirable because it implies that the day-ahead market does not interfere with the incentives
provided by real-time markets. This is particularly important for players that benefit from real-
time market variability (such as peaking units and price-response demands). This also implies that
the ISO does not give any preference to either risk-taking or risk-averse players. We also highlight
that price consistency does not imply that premia do not exist; they can exist in each scenario but
not in expectation.
Deterministic formulations can yield persistent price premia that benefit a subset of players or
that can be used for market manipulation. For instance, consider the case in which a wind farm
forecast has the same mean but very different variance (uncertainty) for several consecutive days.
If the expected forecast is used, the day-ahead prices will be consistently the same for all days,
thus making them more predictable and biased toward a subset of players. While the use of risk-
adaptive reserves can help ameliorate this effect, this approach is not guaranteed to achieve price
consistency.
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4.4. Uplift Payments
From (17) we see that if the premium at a given node is negative (Mpin < 0), negative payments
(losses) can be incurred by the suppliers. This issue is analyzed by Wong and Fuller (2007) and
Morales et al. (2012). For instance, a wind supplier might be cleared at a given forecast capacity
and at a low price but in real-time it might need to buy back power at a larger price if the realized
capacity is lower than forecasted (this is illustrated in Section 6). It is thus desired that suppliers
be paid at least as much as what they asked for and it is desired that consumers do not pay more
than what they are willing to pay for. This is formally stated in the following definition.
Definition 4 (Wholeness). We say that suppliers and consumers are whole in expectation if
E [P gi (ω)]≥ E [Cgi (ω)] , i∈ G (18a)
−E [P dj (ω)]≤−E [Cdj (ω)] , j ∈D. (18b)
If the players are not made whole, they can leave the market and this can hinder diversification.
Uplift payments are routinely used by the ISOs to avoid this situation (Galiana et al. 2003, Baldick
et al. 2005). Uplifts can result from inadequate representations of system behavior such as non-
convexities (O’Neill et al. 2005) or, as we will see in Section 6, can result from using inadequate
statistical representations of real-time market performance in deterministic settings. Consequently,
uplift payments are a useful metric to determine the effectiveness of a given clearing formulation.
Definition 5 (Uplift Payments). We define the expected uplift payments to suppliers and con-
sumers as
MUi :=−min{E[P gi (ω)]−E[Cgi (ω)],0} , i∈ G (19a)
MUj :=−min
{
E[P dj (ω)]−E[Cdj (ω)],0
}
, j ∈D. (19b)
We also define the total uplift as MU :=
∑
i∈G
MUi +
∑
j∈D
MUj .
We highlight that our setting is convex and we thus only consider uplifts arising from inadequate
statistical representations.
4.5. Revenue Adequacy
An efficient clearing procedure must ensure that the ISO does not run into financial deficit. In other
words, the ISO must have a positive cash flow (payments collected from consumers are greater
than the payments given to suppliers). We consider the following expected revenue definition, used
by Pritchard et al. (2010), to assess performance with respect to this case.
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Definition 6 (Revenue Adequacy). The expected net payment to the ISO is defined as
MISO :=E
[∑
i∈G
P gi (ω) +
∑
j∈D
P dj (ω)
]
=
∑
i∈G
E[P gi (ω)] +
∑
j∈D
E[P dj (ω)]. (20)
We say that the ISO is revenue adequate in expectation if MISO ≤ 0.
Revenue adequacy guarantees that, in expectation, the ISO will not run into financial deficit.
5. Properties of Stochastic Clearing
In this section, we prove that the stochastic clearing formulation yields bounded price distortions
and that these distortions can be made arbitrarily small. In addition, we prove that day-ahead
quantities are bounded by real-time quantities and that they converge to a quantile of the real-time
quantities when the distortions are zero. Further, we prove that the formulation yields revenue
adequacy and zero uplifts in expectation.
5.1. No Network Constraints
We begin our discussion with a single-node formulation (no network constraints) and then gen-
eralize the results to the case of network constraints. The single-node formulation has the form:
min
dj ,gi,Gi(·),D(·)
∑
i∈G
E
[
αgiGi(ω) + ∆α
g,+
i (Gi(ω)− gi)+ + ∆αg,−i (Gi(ω)− gi)−
]
+
∑
j∈D
E
[−αdjDj(ω) + ∆αd,+j (Dj(ω)− di)−+ ∆αd,−j (Dj(ω)− dj)+] (21a)
s.t.
∑
i∈G
gi =
∑
j∈D
dj (pi) (21b)∑
i∈G
(Gi(ω)− gi) =
∑
j∈D
(Dj(ω)− dj) ω ∈Ω (p(ω)Π(ω)) (21c)
0≤Gi(ω)≤ G¯i(ω), i∈ G, ω ∈Ω (21d)
0≤Dj(ω)≤ D¯(ω), j ∈D, ω ∈Ω. (21e)
This formulation assumes infinite transmission capacity. In this case, the entire network collapses
into a single node; consequently, a single day-ahead price pi and real-time price Π(ω) are used.
We state that the partial Lagrange function of (21) is given by
L(dj,Dj(·), gi,Gi(·), pi,Π(·))
=
∑
i∈G
E
[
αgiGi(ω) + ∆α
g,+
i (Gi(ω)− gi)+ + ∆αg,−i (Gi(ω)− gi)−
]
Zavala, Kim, Anitescu, and Birge: Stochastic Market Clearing with Consistent Pricing
Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no. 17
−
∑
j∈D
E
[
αdjDj(ω)−∆αd,+j (Dj(ω)− di)−−∆αd,−j (Dj(ω)− dj)+
]
−pi
(∑
i∈G
gi−
∑
j∈D
dj
)
−E
[
Π(ω)
(∑
i∈G
(Gi(ω)− gi)−
∑
j∈D
(Dj(ω)− dj)
)]
.
The contribution of the balance constraints can be written in expected value form if we weight the
Lagrange multipliers of the balance equations (prices) by the probabilities p(ω).
Theorem 2. Consider the single-node stochastic clearing problem (21), and assume that the incre-
mental bid prices are positive. The price distortion Mpi = pi−E[Π(ω)] is bounded as
−∆α+ ≤Mpi ≤∆α−, (22)
where
∆α+ = min
{
min
i∈G
∆αg,+i ,min
j∈D
∆αd,+j
}
(23a)
and
∆α− = min
{
min
i∈G
∆αg,−i ,min
j∈D
∆αd,−j
}
. (23b)
Proof Since (X −x)− = (X −x)+− (X −x), we have the partial Lagrange function
L(dj,Dj(·), gi,Gi(·), pi,Π(·))
=
∑
i∈G
E
[
αgiGi(ω) + ∆α
g,+
i (Gi(ω)− gi)+ + ∆αg,−i (Gi(ω)− gi)+−∆αg,−i (Gi(ω)− gi)
]
−
∑
j∈D
E
[
αdjDj(ω)−∆αd,+j (Dj(ω)− di)+ + ∆αd,+j (Dj(ω)− di)−∆αd,−j (Dj(ω)− dj)+
]
−pi
(∑
i∈G
gi−
∑
j∈D
dj
)
−E
[
Π(ω)
(∑
i∈G
(Gi(ω)− gi)−
∑
j∈D
(Dj(ω)− dj)
)]
.
The stationarity conditions of the partial Lagrange function with respect to the day-ahead quan-
tities dj, gi are given by
0∈ ∂djL= (∆αd,+j + ∆αd,−j )∂djE[(Dj(ω)− dj)+] + ∆αd,+j +pi−E[Π(ω)] j ∈D (24a)
0∈ ∂giL= (∆αg,+i + ∆αg,−i )∂giE[(Gi(ω)− gi)+] + ∆αg,−i −pi+E[Π(ω)] i∈ G. (24b)
Rearranging (24a), we obtain
−∆αd,+j −pi+E[Π(ω)]
∆αd,+j + ∆α
d,−
j
∈ ∂djE[(Dj(ω)− dj)+] j ∈D (25a)
−∆αg,−i +pi−E[Π(ω)]
∆αg,+i + ∆α
g,−
i
∈ ∂giE[(Gi(ω)− gi)+] i∈ G. (25b)
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From the property
∂x(X −x)+ =

−1 if X >x
0 if X <x
[−1,0] if X = x
, (26)
we have
∂xE[(X(ω)−x)+] =
{
E
[−1X(ω)>x + a1X(ω)=x] : a∈ [−1,0]}
= {−P (X(ω)>x) + aP (X(ω) = x) : a∈ [−1,0]} ,
= {η : −P(X(ω)≥ x)≤ η≤−P(X(ω)>x)} . (27)
Since −1≤−P(X(ω)≥ x)≤−P(X(ω)>x)≤ 0, we have
∂xE[(X(ω)−x)+]⊆ [−1,0]. (28)
From (25) and (28), we have
−1≤ −∆α
d,+
j −pi+E [Π(ω)]
∆αd,+j + ∆α
d,−
j
≤ 0 (29a)
−1≤ −∆α
g,−
i +pi−E [Π(ω)]
∆αg,+i + ∆α
g,−
i
≤ 0. (29b)
The above relationships are equivalent to
−∆αd,+j ≤ pi−E [Π(ω)]≤∆αd,−j (30a)
−∆αg,+i ≤ pi−E [Π(ω)]≤∆αg,−i . (30b)
or, equivalently, −∆α+ ≤Mpi ≤∆α−. 
The price distortion is bounded above by the smallest of all ∆αg,−i and ∆α
d,−
j and bounded below
by the largest of all −∆αg,+i and −∆αd,+j . The bounds are denoted by ∆α− and −∆α+, respectively.
This implies that if we let ∆α+ and ∆α− be sufficiently small, then we can make the price distortion
Mpi arbitrarily small. Note that the bound is independent of the cleared quantities, which reflects
robust behavior. Moreover, the upper bound depends on the incremental bid prices ∆αg,−i and
∆αd,−j only, while the lower bound depends on ∆α
g,+
i and ∆α
d,+
j only. Boundedness of the price
distortion also eliminates the day-ahead component of the suppliers and consumer payments and
thus achieves payment consistency. We highlight that Theorem 2 assumes the positive incremental
bid prices. Otherwise, the solution can be degenerate.
We now prove that the day-ahead quantities dj, gi obtained from the stochastic clearing model
are implicitly bounded by the minimum and maximum real-time quantities.
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Theorem 3. Consider the single-node stochastic clearing problem (21), and assume that the incre-
mental bid prices are positive. The day-ahead quantities are bounded by the real-time quantities
as
min
ω∈Ω
Dj(ω)≤ dj ≤max
ω∈Ω
Dj(ω), j ∈D
min
ω∈Ω
Gi(ω)≤ gi ≤max
ω∈Ω
Gi(ω), i∈ G.
Proof Consider the following two cases:
• Case 1: The price distortion hits the lower bound for demand j; we thus have pi−E [Π(ω)] =
−∆αd,+j . This implies 0 ∈ ∂djE[(Dj(ω) − dj)+] from (25a), and hence P(Dj(ω) > dj) = 0 and
P(Dj(ω)≤ dj) = 1 from (26). This implies that dj ≥Dj(ω), ∀ω ∈Ω and dj ≥minω∈ΩDj(ω).
• Case 2: The price distortion hits the upper bound for demand j; we thus have pi−E [Π(ω)] =
∆αd,−j . This implies −1∈ ∂djE[(Dj(ω)− dj)+] from (25a), and hence P(Dj(ω)≥ dj) = 1 from (26).
This implies that dj ≤Dj(ω), ∀ω ∈Ω and dj ≤maxω∈ΩDj(ω).
We thus conclude that dj is bounded from below by minω∈ΩDj(ω) and from above by
maxω∈ΩDj(ω). The same procedure can be followed to prove that gi is bounded from below by
minω∈ΩGi(ω) and from above by maxω∈ΩGi(ω). 
The implicit bound on the day-ahead quantities dj, gi is a key property of the stochastic model
proposed because it implies that we do not have to choose day-ahead capacities g¯i, d¯j (e.g., sum-
marization statistics). These are automatically set by the model through the scenario information.
This is important because, as we have mentioned, obtaining proper summarizing statistics for
complex probability distributions might not be trivial.
We now prove that if the price distortion is zero, the day-ahead quantities converge to quantiles
of the real-time quantities.
Theorem 4. Consider the stochastic clearing problem (21), and assume that the incremental bid
prices are positive. If the price distortion is zero at the solution, then
dj =QDj(ω)
(
∆αd,−j
∆αd,+j + ∆α
d,−
j
)
, j ∈D (31a)
gi =QGi(ω)
(
∆αg,+i
∆αg,+i + ∆α
g,−
i
)
, i∈ G. (31b)
Proof From (27) and (29a) we have that if pi − E [Π(ω)] = 0, then −P(Dj(ω) ≥ dj) ≤
−∆αd,+j
∆α
d,+
j +∆α
d,−
j
≤ −P(Dj(ω) > dj), and thus P(Dj(ω) < dj) ≤ ∆α
d,−
j
∆α
d,+
j +∆α
d,−
j
≤ P(Dj(ω) ≤ dj). This
implies (31a) from (2). The same argument holds for (31b). 
Corollary 2. If the incremental bid prices are symmetric then dj =M (Dj(ω)) , j ∈D and gi =
M (Dj(ω)) , i∈ G.
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Proof The proof follows from Corollary 1 and Theorem 4. 
This result implies that the day-ahead quantities dj, gi cannot in general be guaranteed to con-
verge to the expected values of the real-time quantities E[Dj(ω)],E[Gi(ω)]. Such convergence can
only be guaranteed when the quantile and mean coincide. These observations thus imply that
the expected value is not necessarily the only statistic that can be used for the capacities in the
day-ahead market.
We now prove that the stochastic formulation yields zero uplifts in expectation. Revenue ade-
quacy is not considered because this is a single-node problem. We use the strategy followed by
Morales et al. (2012). For this discussion, we denote a minimizer of the partial Lagrange function
(subject to the constraints (21d) and (21e)) as d∗j ,Dj(·)∗, g∗i ,Gi(·)∗, pi∗,Π∗(·). Because the problem
is convex, we know that the optimal prices pi∗,Π∗(·) satisfy
(d∗j ,Dj(·)∗, g∗i ,G∗i (·)) = argmin
dj ,Dj(·),gi,Gi(·)
L(dj,Dj(·), gi,Gi(·), pi∗,Π∗(·)) s.t. (21d)− (21e). (32)
Moreover, at fixed pi∗,Π∗(·), the partial Lagrange function can be separated as
L(dj,Dj(·), gi,Gi(·), pi∗,Π∗(·)) =
∑
i∈G
Lgi (gi,Gi(·), pi∗,Π∗(·)) +
∑
j∈D
Ldj (dj,Dj(·), pi∗,Π∗(·)), (33)
where
Lgi (gi,Gi(·), pi∗,Π∗(·)) :=E[Cgi (ω)]−E[P gi (ω)], i∈ G (34a)
Ldj (dj,Dj(·), pi∗,Π∗(·)) :=E[Cdj (ω)]−E[P dj (ω)], j ∈D. (34b)
Consequently, one can minimize the partial Lagrange function by minimizing (34) independently.
Theorem 5. Consider the single-node clearing problem (21), and let the assumptions of Theo-
rem 2 hold. Any minimizer d∗j ,Dj(·)∗, g∗i ,Gi(·)∗, pi∗,Π∗(·) of (21) yields zero uplift payments in
expectation:
MUi = 0, i∈ G (35a)
MUj = 0, j ∈D. (35b)
Proof From Definition 5, it suffices to show that E[P gi (ω)] − E[Cgi (ω)] ≥ 0 for all i ∈
G and E[P dj (ω)] − E[Cdj (ω)] ≥ 0 for all j ∈ D. For fixed pi∗,Π∗(ω), the candidate solu-
tion dj = Dj(·) = gi = Gi(·) = 0 is feasible for (32) with values Lgi (gi,Gi(·), pi∗,Π∗(·)) =
0, i ∈ G and Ld(dj,Dj(·), pi∗,Π∗(·)) = 0, j ∈ D. Because the candidate is suboptimal we have
Lgi (g∗i ,G∗i (·), pi∗,Π∗(·)) ≤ Lgi (gi,Gi(·), pi∗,Π∗(·)) = 0 and Ldj (d∗j ,D∗j (·), pi∗,Π∗(·)) ≤ 0. The result fol-
lows from equations (34) and the definition of MUi and MUj in (19). 
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5.2. Network Constraints
Having established some insights into the properties of the stochastic model, we now turn our
attention to the full stochastic problem with network constraints (6) and generalize our results.
It is well known that stochastic formulations yield a better expected social surplus. This follows
from the well-known inequality (see Birge and Louveaux (1997)):
ϕstoWS ≤ϕsto ≤ϕdet. (36)
This follows from the fact that the stochastic formulation will lead to a lower recourse cost (real-time
penalty costs) than will the deterministic solution because the deterministic day-ahead problem
does not anticipate recourse actions. The wait-and-see setting can perfectly anticipate real-time
market conditions and therefore its real-time penalties are zero. This makes it the optimal, but
nonimplementable policy.
We now establish boundedness of the price distortions throughout the network. To establish our
result, we need the following definitions. We rewrite equations (6c) and (6e) as
f` =
∑
n∈N
B`nθn ∀`∈L, (37a)
F`(ω) =
∑
n∈N
B`nΘn(ω) ∀ω ∈Ω, `∈L, (37b)
where
B`n =

B` if n= rec(`),
−B` if n= snd(`),
0 otherwise.
We note that the above definitions imply that B`,rec(`) =B` and B`,snd(`) =−B`. Moreover we have
that, ∑
`∈Lrecn
f` =
∑
`∈Lrecn
(
B`θrec(`)−B`θsnd(`)
)
=
∑
`∈Lrecn
(
B`,rec(`)θrec(`) +B`,snd(`)θsnd(`)
)
=
∑
`∈Lrecn
(
B`nθn +B`,snd(`)θsnd(`)
)
.
Using similar observations we have that,∑
`∈Lsndn
f` =
∑
`∈Lsndn
(
B`,rec(`)θrec(`) +B`nθn
)
. (38)
Substituting the flows f`,F`(ω) by their corresponding phase angle expressions and using the above
properties we have that the stochastic clearing problem (37) can be written as
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min
dj ,Dj(·),gi,Gi(·),θn,Θn(·)
∑
i∈G
E
[
αgiGi(ω) + ∆α
g,+
i (Gi(ω)− gi)+ + ∆αg,−i (Gi(ω)− gi)−
]
+
∑
j∈D
E
[−αdjDj(ω) + ∆αd,+j (Dj(ω)− dj)−+ ∆αd,−j (Dj(ω)− dj)+]
+
∑
`∈L
E
∆αf,+`
(∑
n∈N
B`n(Θn(ω)− θn)
)
+
+ ∆αf,−`
(∑
n∈N
B`n(Θn(ω)− θn)
)
−

+
∑
n∈N
E
[
∆αθ,+n (Θn(ω)− θn)+ + ∆αθ,−n (Θn(ω)− θn)−
]
(39a)
s.t.
∑
`∈Lrecn
(
B`nθn +B`,snd(`)θsnd(`)
)− ∑
`∈Lsndn
(
B`,rec(`)θrec(`) +B`nθn
)
+
∑
i∈Gn
gi−
∑
i∈Dn
di = 0, (pin) ∀n∈N (39b)∑
`∈Lrecn
[
B`n (Θn(ω)− θn) +B`,snd(`)
(
Θsnd(`)(ω)− θsnd(`)
)]
−
∑
`∈Lsndn
[
B`,rec(`)
(
Θrec(`)(ω)− θrec(`)
)
+B`n (Θn(ω)− θn)
]
+
∑
i∈Gn
(Gi(ω)− gi)−
∑
j∈Dn
(Dj(ω)− dj) = 0, (p(ω)Πn(ω)), ∀ω ∈Ω, n∈N
(39c)
− F¯`(ω)≤
∑
n∈N
B`nΘn(ω)≤ F¯`(ω), ∀ω ∈Ω, `∈L (39d)
0≤Gi(ω)≤ G¯i(ω), ∀ω ∈Ω, i∈ G (39e)
0≤Dj(ω)≤ D¯j(ω), ∀ω ∈Ω, j ∈D (39f)
θn ≤Θn(ω)≤ θn, ∀ω ∈Ω, n∈N . (39g)
We consider the partial Lagrange function of (39) as
L(dj,Dj(·), gi,Gi(·), θn,Θn(·), pin,Πn(·))
=
∑
i∈G
E
[
αgiGi(ω) +
(
∆αg,+i + ∆α
g,−
i
)
(Gi(ω)− gi)+−∆αg,−i (Gi(ω)− gi)
]
−
∑
j∈D
E
[
αdjDj(ω)−
(
∆αd,+j + ∆α
d,−
j
)
(Dj(ω)− dj)+ + ∆αd,+j (Dj(ω)− dj)
]
+
∑
`∈L
E
(∆αf,+` + ∆αf,−` )
(∑
n∈N
B`n(Θn(ω)− θn)
)
+
−∆αf,−`
∑
n∈N
B`n(Θn(ω)− θn)

+
∑
n∈N
E
[(
∆αθ,+n + ∆α
θ,−
n
)
(Θn(ω)− θn)+−∆αθ,−n (Θn(ω)− θn)
]
−
∑
n∈N
pin
 ∑
`∈Lrecn
(
B`nθn +B`,snd(`)θsnd(`)
)− ∑
`∈Lsndn
(
B`,rec(`)θrec(`) +B`nθn
)
+
∑
i∈Gn
gi−
∑
j∈Dn
dj

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−E
∑
n∈N
Πn(ω)
 ∑
`∈Lrecn
[
B`n (Θn(ω)− θn) +B`,snd(`)
(
Θsnd(`)(ω)− θsnd(`)
)]
−
∑
`∈Lsndn
[
B`,rec(`)
(
Θrec(`)(ω)− θrec(`)
)
+B`n (Θn(ω)− θn)
]
+
∑
i∈Gn
(Gi(ω)− gi)−
∑
j∈Dn
(Dj(ω)− dj)
)]
. (40)
We define the subset N¯ ⊆ N containing all nodes at which at least one supplier or consumer is
connected. We also define the subset Ln :=Lrecn ∪Lsndn .
Theorem 6. Consider the stochastic clearing model (39) and assume that the incremental bid
prices are positive and that ∆αf,+` ,∆α
f,−
` ,∆α
θ,+
n ,∆α
θ,−
n > 0, ` ∈ L, n ∈ N . The price distortions
Mpin, n∈N are bounded as
−∆α¯+n ≤Mpin ≤∆α¯−n , n∈ N¯ ,
−∆α+n ≤Mpin ≤∆α−n , n∈N\N¯ ,
where
∆α¯+n = min
{
min
i∈Gn
∆αg,+i , min
j∈Dn
∆αd,+j ,∆α
+
n
}
, n∈ N¯ ,
∆α¯−n = min
{
min
i∈Gn
∆αg,−i , min
j∈Dn
∆αd,−j ,∆α
−
n
}
, n∈ N¯
and
∆α+n =
∑
`∈Ln
(
∆αf,+` + (1−B`n)∆αf,−`
)
+ ∆αθ,+n∑
`∈Ln B`
, n∈N ,
∆α−n =
∑
`∈Ln B`n∆α
f,−
` + ∆α
θ,−
n∑
`∈Ln B`
, n∈N .
Proof The stationarity conditions of the partial Lagrange function with respect to the day-
ahead quantities gi, dj and phase angles θn are given by
0∈ ∂djL= (∆αd,+j + ∆αd,−j )∂djE[(Dj(ω)− dj)+] + ∆αd,+j +pin(j)−E
[
Πn(j)(ω)
]
j ∈D (41a)
0∈ ∂giL= (∆αg,+i + ∆αg,−i )∂giE[(Gi(ω)− gi)+] + ∆αg,−i −pin(i) +E
[
Πn(i)(ω)
]
i∈ G (41b)
0∈ ∂θnL=
∑
`∈Ln
(
∆αf,+` + ∆α
f,−
`
)
∂θnE
(∑
m∈N
B`m(Θm(ω)− θm)
)
+
+ ∑
`∈Ln
B`n∆α
f,−
`
+
(
∆αθ,+n + ∆α
θ,−
n
)
∂θnE
[
(Θn(ω)− θn)+
]
+ ∆αθ,−n
−
 ∑
`∈Lrecn
B`n−
∑
`∈Lsndn
B`n
 (pin−E [Πn(ω)]) n∈N , (41c)
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where we recall that n(i) is the node at which supplier i is connected and n(j) is the node at which
demand j is connected. Following the same bounding procedure used in the proof of Theorem 2,
we obtain
−∆αd,+j ≤Mpin(j) ≤∆αd,−j , j ∈D
−∆αg,+i ≤Mpin(i) ≤∆αg,−i , i∈ G.
Rearranging (41c), we obtain
−
∑
`∈Ln
B`n∆α
f,−
` −∆αθ,−n +
 ∑
`∈Lrecn
B`n−
∑
`∈Lsndn
B`n
Mpin ∈ Sn, (42)
where
Sn :=
∑
`∈Ln
(
∆αf,+` + ∆α
f,−
`
)
∂θnE
(∑
m∈N
B`m(Θm(ω)− θm)
)
+

+
(
∆αθ,+n + ∆α
θ,−
n
)
∂θnE
[
(Θn(ω)− θn)+
]
(43)
Because ∂θnE
[(∑
m∈N B`m(Θm(ω)− θm)
)
+
]
⊆ [−1,0] and ∂θnE
[
(Θn(ω)− θn)+
]⊆ [−1,0], we have
Sn ⊆
[
−
∑
`∈Ln
(
∆αf,+` + ∆α
f,−
`
)−∆αθ,+n −∆αθ,−n ,0
]
, (44)
and therefore, from (42) and (44),
−
∑
`∈Ln
(
∆αf,+` + ∆α
f,−
`
)−∆αθ,+n −∆αθ,−n
≤−
∑
`∈Ln
B`n∆α
f,−
` −∆αθ,−n +
 ∑
`∈Lrecn
B`n−
∑
`∈Lsndn
B`n
Mpin
=−
∑
`∈Ln
B`n∆α
f,−
` −∆αθ,−n +
∑
`∈Ln
B`Mpin ≤ 0. (45)
Hence, we have ∆α+n ≤Mpin ≤∆α−n . Because ∆α¯+n and ∆α¯−n are the smallest incremental bid prices
at node n∈ N¯ , we obtain the bound −∆α¯+n ≤Mpin ≤∆α¯−n , n∈ N¯ . 
The price distortion is bounded for every node ∈ N . Moreover, if the penalty parameters
∆αf,+` ,∆α
f,−
` ,∆α
θ,+
n ,∆α
θ,−
n are made arbitrarily small, then the price distortion at every node
becomes arbitrarily small. We now state results that are natural extensions of Theorems 3 and 4.
Theorem 7. Consider the stochastic clearing model (39), and let the assumptions of Theorem 6
hold. The day-ahead quantities and phase angles are bounded by the real-time quantities and phase
angles as
min
ω∈Ω
Dj(ω)≤ dj ≤max
ω∈Ω
Dj(ω), j ∈D
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min
ω∈Ω
Gi(ω)≤ gi ≤max
ω∈Ω
Gi(ω), i∈ G
min
ω∈Ω
F`(ω)≤ f` ≤max
ω∈Ω
F`(ω), `∈L
min
ω∈Ω
Θn(ω)≤ θn ≤max
ω∈Ω
Θn(ω), n∈N .
Proof For the suppliers and demands, we can use the same procedure used in the proof of
Theorem 3. The bounds on the day-ahead flows and phase angles follow the same argument as
well. We use the definition (43) for simplicity. Consider the following two cases:
• Case 1: The price distortion hits the lower bound for node n; we thus haveMpin =−∆α+n . This
implies that −∑`∈Ln (∆αf,+` + ∆αf,−` )−∆αθ,+n −∆αθ,−n ∈ Sn from (42), and hence we have
− 1∈ ∂θnE
[
(Θn(ω)− θn)+
]
(46a)
− 1∈ ∂θnE
(∑
n∈N
B`n(Θn(ω)− θn)
)
+
 , `∈Ln. (46b)
From (26), equation (46a) implies that P (Θn(ω)≥ θn) = 1, and equation (46b) implies that
P(
∑
n∈N B`nΘn(ω) ≥
∑
n∈N B`nθn) = P(F`(ω) ≥ f`) = 1 for ` ∈ Ln. Therefore, we have θn ≤
Θn(ω), ω ∈ Ω and θn ≤ maxω∈Ω Θn(ω). Similarly, f` ≤ F`(ω), ∀ω ∈ Ω and f` ≤ maxω∈ΩF`(ω) for
`∈Ln.
• Case 2: The price distortion hits the upper bound for node n; we thus have Mpin = ∆α−n . This
implies 0∈ Sn from (42), and hence we have
0∈ ∂θnE
[
(Θn(ω)− θn)+
]
(47a)
0∈ ∂θnE
(∑
n∈N
B`n(Θn(ω)− θn)
)
+
 , `∈Ln. (47b)
From (26), equation (47a) implies that P (Θn(ω)≤ θn) = 1, and equation (46b) implies that
P(
∑
n∈N B`nΘn(ω) ≤
∑
n∈N B`nθn) = P(F`(ω) ≤ f`) = 1 for ` ∈ Ln. Therefore, we have θn ≥
Θn(ω), ω ∈ Ω and θn ≥ minω∈Ω Θn(ω). Similarly, f` ≥ F`(ω), ∀ω ∈ Ω and f` ≥ minω∈ΩF`(ω) for
`∈Ln.

Theorem 8. Consider the stochastic clearing problem (39), and let the assumptions of Theorem
6 hold. If the price distortions Mpin, n∈N are zero at the solution, then
dj =QDj(ω)
(
∆αd,−j
∆αd,+j + ∆α
d,−
j
)
, j ∈D (48a)
gi =QGi(ω)
(
∆αg,+i
∆αg,+i + ∆α
g,−
i
)
, i∈ G. (48b)
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Proof For (48a) and (48b), we can use the same procedure used in the proof of Theorem 4. 
Corollary 3. If the incremental bid prices are symmetric from Corollary 1, then dj =
M (Dj(ω)) , j ∈D, and gi =M (Gi(ω)) , i∈ G.
We treat the penalty terms purely as a means to constrain the day-ahead flows and phase angles
and induce the desired pricing properties. Our results indicate that this can be done with no harm
by allowing ∆αf,+` ,∆α
f,−
` ,∆α
θ,+
n ,∆α
θ,−
n to be sufficiently small. Moreover, making these arbitrarily
small guarantees that the expected social surplus of the stochastic problem (12) satisfies ϕsto ≈ϕ.
The alternative is to simply impose day-ahead bounds of the forms (4d) and (4g) and to eliminate
the penalty terms on the flows and phase angles. In this case, however, we cannot guarantee that
the price distortions are bounded, as we illustrate in the next section. In addition, similar to the
case of day-ahead quantities, imposing day-ahead bounds on flows would require us to choose a
proper statistic for the bounds of flows and phase angles, which might not be trivial to do.
We now prove revenue adequacy and zero uplift payments in expectation for the network-
constrained formulation. We denote a minimizer of the partial Lagrange function (40) (subject to
the constraints (6f)-(6h)) as d∗j ,D
∗
j (·), g∗i ,G∗i (·), θ∗n,Θ∗n(·), pi∗n,Π∗n(·). Because the problem is convex,
we know that the prices pi∗n,Π
∗
n(·) satisfy
(d∗j ,Dj(·)∗, g∗i ,G∗i (·), θ∗n,Θ∗n(·)) = argmin
dj ,Dj(·),gi,Gi(·),θn,Θn(·)
L(dj,Dj(·), gi,Gi(·), θn,Θn(·), pi∗n,Π∗n(·))
s.t. (6f)− (6h).
Moreover, at pi∗n,Π
∗
n(·), the partial Lagrange function can be separated as
L(dj,Dj(·), gi,Gi(·), θn,Θn(·), pi∗n,Π∗n(·)) =∑
i∈G
Lgi (gi,Gi(·), pi∗n,Π∗n(·)) +
∑
j∈D
Ldj (dj,Dj(·), pi∗n,Π∗n(·)) +Lθ(θn,Θn(·), pi∗n,Π∗n(·)). (49)
where the first two terms are defined in (34) and
Lθ(θ`,Θ`(·), pi∗n,Π∗n(·)) =∑
`∈L
E
∆αf,+`
(∑
n∈N
B`n(Θn(ω)− θn)
)
+
+ ∆αf,−`
(∑
n∈N
B`n(Θn(ω)− θn)
)
−

+
∑
n∈N
E
[
∆αθ,+n (Θn(ω)− θn)+ + ∆αθ,−n (Θn(ω)− θn)−
]
−
∑
n∈N
pin
 ∑
`∈Lrecn
(
B`nθn +B`,snd(`)θsnd(`)
)− ∑
`∈Lsndn
(
B`,rec(`)θrec(`) +B`nθn
)
−E
∑
n∈N
Πn(ω)
 ∑
`∈Lrecn
[
B`n (Θn(ω)− θn) +B`,snd(`)
(
Θsnd(`)(ω)− θsnd(`)
)]
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−
∑
`∈Lsndn
[
B`,rec(`)
(
Θrec(`)(ω)− θrec(`)
)
+B`n (Θn(ω)− θn)
] (50)
Consequently, one can minimize the partial Lagrange function by minimizing (34) and (50) inde-
pendently.
Theorem 9. Consider the stochastic clearing problem (39), and let the assumptions of Theorem
6 hold. Any minimizer d∗j ,Dj(·)∗, g∗i ,Gi(·)∗, θ∗n,Θ∗n, pi∗n,Π∗n(·) of (39) yields zero uplift payments for
all players and revenue adequacy in expectation:
MUi = 0, i∈ G, (51a)
MUj = 0, j ∈D, (51b)
MISO ≤ 0. (51c)
Proof For fixed pi∗n,Π
∗
n(·), by the separation of the partial Lagrange function, the zero uplift
payments directly result from Theorem 5. At fixed pi∗n,Π
∗
n(·) we also note that θn = Θn(·) = 0
is a feasible candidate solution for the maximization of Lθ(θn,Θn(·), pi∗n,Π∗n(·)) and that, at this
suboptimal point, this term is also zero.
If the flow balances (6b) and (6d) hold, we have
0 =−
∑
n∈N
pin
 ∑
`∈Lrecn
(
B`nθn +B`,snd(`)θsnd(`)
)− ∑
`∈Lsndn
(
B`,rec(`)θrec(`) +B`nθn
)
+
∑
i∈Gn
gi−
∑
j∈Dn
dj

−E
∑
n∈N
Πn(ω)
 ∑
`∈Lrecn
[
B`n (Θn(ω)− θn) +B`,snd(`)
(
Θsnd(`)(ω)− θsnd(`)
)]
−
∑
`∈Lsndn
[
B`,rec(`)
(
Θrec(`)(ω)− θrec(`)
)
+B`n (Θn(ω)− θn)
]
+
∑
i∈Gn
(Gi(ω)− gi)−
∑
j∈Dn
(Dj(ω)− dj)
)]
. (52)
Consequently, for any arbitrary set of prices pin,Πn(·), we have
−
∑
n∈N
pin
 ∑
`∈Lrecn
(
B`nθn +B`,snd(`)θsnd(`)
)− ∑
`∈Lsndn
(
B`,rec(`)θrec(`) +B`nθn
)
−E
∑
n∈N
Πn(ω)
 ∑
`∈Lrecn
[
B`n (Θn(ω)− θn) +B`,snd(`)
(
Θsnd(`)(ω)− θsnd(`)
)]
−
∑
`∈Lsndn
[
B`,rec(`)
(
Θrec(`)(ω)− θrec(`)
)
+B`n (Θn(ω)− θn)
]
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=
∑
n∈N
pin
(∑
i∈Gn
gi−
∑
j∈Dn
dj
)
+E
[∑
n∈N
Πn(ω)
(∑
i∈Gn
(Gi(ω)− gi)−
∑
j∈Dn
(Dj(ω)− dj)
)]
=
∑
i∈Gn
pin(i)gi +E
[∑
i∈Gn
Πn(i)(ω) (Gi(ω)− gi)
]
−
∑
j∈Dn
pin(j)dj −E
[∑
j∈Dn
Πn(j)(ω) (Dj(ω)− dj)
]
=MISO.
Therefore, we have
0≥Lθ(θ∗n,Θ∗n(·), pi∗n,Π∗n(·))
≥−
∑
n∈N
pin
 ∑
`∈Lrecn
(
B`nθn +B`,snd(`)θsnd(`)
)− ∑
`∈Lsndn
(
B`,rec(`)θrec(`) +B`nθn
)
−E
∑
n∈N
Πn(ω)
 ∑
`∈Lrecn
[
B`n (Θn(ω)− θn) +B`,snd(`)
(
Θsnd(`)(ω)− θsnd(`)
)]
−
∑
`∈Lsndn
[
B`,rec(`)
(
Θrec(`)(ω)− θrec(`)
)
+B`n (Θn(ω)− θn)
]
=MISO,
where the second inequality holds because
∑
`∈L
E
∆αf,+`
(∑
n∈N
B`n(Θn(ω)− θn)
)
+
+ ∆αf,−`
(∑
n∈N
B`n(Θn(ω)− θn)
)
−

+
∑
n∈N
E
[
∆αθ,+n (Θn(ω)− θn)+ + ∆αθ,−n (Θn(ω)− θn)−
]≥ 0. 
We highlight that the introduction of the penalty terms for flows does not affect revenue adequacy
and cost recovery because the partial Lagrange function remains separable for fixed prices.
6. Computational Studies
In this section, we illustrate the different properties of the stochastic model. We also demonstrate
that the stochastic model outperforms the deterministic one in all the metrics proposed. We also
seek to highlight stochastic formulations provide benefits that go beyond improvements in social
surplus. The optimization problems considered in this section were solved using CPLEX-12.6.1.
All models can be accessed at http://zavalab.engr.wisc.edu/data.
6.1. System I
We first consider System I sketched in Figure 1. The system has two deterministic suppliers on
nodes 1 and 3 and a stochastic supplier on node 2. The stochastic supplier has three possible
capacity scenarios G2(ω) = {25,50,75} MWh of equal probabilities p(ω) = {1/3,1/3,1/3}. For
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Figure 1 Scheme of System I.
G¯ = 50
↵ = 20
G¯ = 50
↵ = 10
D¯ = 100
↵ = 1000
1 2 3
G¯(!) = {25, 50, 75}
↵ = 1
F¯ = 25 F¯ = 50
deterministic clearing, the day-ahead capacity limit g¯ for the wind supplier will be set to 50 MWh,
the expected value forecast. The demand in node 2 is deterministic at a level of 100 MWh. We
use αd = V OLL=1000$/MWh as the bid price and an incremental bid price of ∆αd = 0.001. The
bid prices αgi for the suppliers are {10,1,20} $/MWh, and the incremental bid prices ∆αgi are
{1.0,0.1,2.0} $/MWh. The transmission capacities of lines 1→ 2 and 2→ 3 are deterministic and set
to F¯1→2 = {25,25,25} MWh and F¯2→3 = {50,50,50}, respectively, with the penalty of ∆αf = 0.001.
The line capacities have been designed such that the system becomes stressed in the scenario in
which the stochastic supplier delivers only 25 MWh. We assume that the line susceptances are 50
for both lines. In this scenario, both transmission lines become congested, and real-time prices will
reach high values. We use the penalty parameter ∆αθn = 0.001.
We compare the performance of the deterministic, stochastic here-and-now, and the stochastic
wait-and-see (WS) settings. The results are presented in Table 1. We compare the expected surplus
for the suppliers ϕg as well as prices and quantities. Because the demand is deterministic, the
surplus for the consumers ϕload is a constant. Consequently, we show only ϕg. For the deterministic
setting, the expected supply surplus ϕg is $835, and the day-ahead prices pin are {10,20,20} $/MWh.
The price difference between the first two nodes results from the binding day-ahead flow for line
1→ 2 line at 25 MWh. In the real-time market, the prices for each scenario Πn(ω) are {9,1000,22},
{9,20,20}, and {9,14,14} $/MWh with expected value E[Πn(ω)] ={9,345,19}. There is a strong
distortion in the prices, indicated by the metrics Mpiavg = 109 and Mpimax = 325.
We now analyze the clearing of the stochastic formulation. The day-ahead prices are {10,276,154}
and the real-time prices are {10,792,428}, {10,20,20}, {10,15,15} with expected value {10,276,154}.
The price distortion metricsMpiavg,Mpimax are both zero. The stochastic WS (wait-and-see) solution
is consistent in that it leads to no corrections of quantities in the real-time market and it yields the
same day-ahead and real-time prices. Thus, we can guarantee convergence of day-ahead and real-
time prices for each scenario only in the presence of perfect information. We note that the expected
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Table 1 System I. Comparison of quantities, prices, and social surplus.
gi pin Gi(ω) Πn(ω) E[Πn(ω)] ϕg Mpimax
{25,25,50} {9,1000,22}
Deterministic {25,50,25} {10,20,20} {25,50,25} {9,20,20} {9,345,19} 835 325
{25,75,0} {9,14,14}
{25,25,50} {10,792,428}
Stochastic {25,50,25} {10,276,154} {25,50,25} {10,20,20} {10,276,154} 835 0
{25,75,0} {10,15,15}
{25,25,50} {10,1000,929} {25,25,50} {10,1000,929}
Stochastic-WS {25,50,25} {10,20,20} {25,50,25} {10,20,20} {10,345,321} 800 NA
{25,75,0} {10,14,14} {25,75,0} {10,14,14}
Table 2 System I. Comparison of suppliers and ISO revenues.
E[P gi (ω)] E[C
g
i (ω)] MISO
Deterministic {250,-7219,569} {250,52,533} -8400
Stochastic {250,7321,7295} {250,52,533} -12719
Stochastic-WS {250,9021,15656} {250,50,500} -9546
surplus as well as the day-ahead and real-time quantities for the stochastic and deterministic
formulations are the same. The reason is that the the deterministic and stochastic formulations have
the same primal solution. This situation might lead the practitioner to believe that no benefits are
obtained from the stochastic formulation. The prices obtained, however, are completely different.
Hence one can see that arguments based on social surplus do not fully capture the benefits of
stochastic formulations.
The different prices obtained with both formulations lead to drastically different payment dis-
tributions among the market participants. As seen in Table 2, for the deterministic setting the
suppliers obtain expected payments E[P gi (ω)] of ${250,-7219,569}. The wind supplier receives neg-
ative payments, and requires an uplift to enable cost recovery. In this case, the expected cost
E[Cgi (ω)] for the wind supplier is $52 and thus requires an expected uplift MUi of $7,271. For
the stochastic formulation, the expected payments are ${250,7321,7295}. The wind supplier has
positive payments and no uplift is required. This situation illustrates that the stochastic setting
allocates resources efficiently. Note that all formulations are revenue adequate in expectation.
Remark 1. The optimization problems for System I are highly degenerate, and thus multiple dual
solutions (i.e., prices in our context) are available. We highlight that the solutions reported in this
section were obtained from the barrier method (without crossover) implemented in CPLEX-12.6.1,
which would provide central point solutions. However, we also report the solutions obtained from
different linear programming algorithms in Appendix.
Zavala, Kim, Anitescu, and Birge: Stochastic Market Clearing with Consistent Pricing
Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no. 31
6.1.1. Bounds on Day-ahead Quantities We now demonstrate that adding bounds on
the day-ahead flows and phase angles, as opposed to adding penalty terms, can affect the pricing
properties of the stochastic model. The price distortions pi − E[Π(ω)] obtained using day-ahead
bounds (without the penalty term) are {−0.4,0,0} while those obtained with the penalty term
using a penalty of ∆αf = ∆αθ = 0.001 (without the bounds) are {0,0,0}. The penalty term achieves
the desired pricing property. The day-ahead flows obtained with the penalty terms are {25,25};
these are the medians of the real-time flows which are {25,50} for scenario 1, {25,25} for sce-
nario 2, and {25,0} for scenario 3. This also implies that the day-ahead flows are bounded and
therefore day-ahead bounds are redundant. Similarly, the day-ahead phase angles obtained with
the penalty terms are {−3.58,−3.08,−3.58}; these are the medians of the real-time phase angles
{−3.52,−3.02,−4.02},{−3.58,−3.08,−3.58}, and {−3.65,−3.15,−3.15} for scenarios 1, 2 and 3,
respectively. This suggests that the day-ahead bounds bias the statistics.
6.1.2. Effect of Incremental Bid Prices We experiment the effect that the incremental
bid prices have on the price distortion. Consider the case in which the demand in the central node
is also stochastic and with scenarios D(ω) = {100,50,25}. We set the incremental bid price for
the stochastic supplier ∆αg2 to 1.0. For the demand incremental bid prices ∆α
d = 0.001,0.01,0.1,
and 1.0, the maximum price distortions Mpimax are 0.001,0.010,0.069, and 0.334, respectively. The
distortion remains bounded by the incremental bid and can be made arbitrarily small as we decrease
the incremental bid. The result is consistent with the properties established.
6.2. System II
We now consider the more complex system presented in Figure 2. This is an adapted version of
the system presented in Pritchard et al. (2010). The system has two stochastic suppliers in nodes
2 and 4, three deterministic suppliers in nodes 1, 3, and 5 and one stochastic demand in node 6.
The demand is treated as inelastic. The demand follows a normal distribution with mean 250 and
standard deviation 50. We use sample average approximation for solving this model and generate
25 scenarios of the demand with equal probabilities. The stochastic suppliers can have 5 possible
capacities {10,20,60,70,90} MW. Each scenario represents one of the 25 different permutations
from all possible capacities. The bid prices αgi for the suppliers are {100,1,100,1,200} $/MWh,
and the incremental bid prices ∆αgi are {10,0.1,10,0.1,20}. We set αd = V OLL = 1000 $/MWh
and ∆αd = 0.001. We also set the penalty parameters ∆αf` = ∆α
θ
n = 0.001. We assume that all the
line susceptances are 50.
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Figure 2 Scheme of System II.
1 5
3
2 4
6
G¯ = 100
G¯ = 100
G¯ = 50
↵ = 100
↵ = 100
↵ = 200
↵ = 1000
D¯(!) ⇠ N (250, 50)
↵ = 1↵ = 1
G¯(!) = {10, 20, 60, 70, 90}G¯(!) = {10, 20, 60, 70, 90} F¯ = 50F¯ = 50
F¯ = 50
F¯ = 25
F¯ = 25F¯ = 25
F¯ = 100
F¯ = 100F¯ = 100
Table 3 System II. Comparison of day-ahead prices and surplus with deterministic and stochastic
formulations.
ϕ Mpin pin
Deterministic -139569 {4,−28,−17,−158,−61,36} {100,−800,67,1,501,1000}
Stochastic -139569 {−0.001,0,0,0,0,0} {100,−764,87,159,562,964}
Stochastic-WS -139737 NA NA
6.2.1. Price Distortion and Uplift Payments The results are presented in Tables 3 and
4. We first note that the price distortion for the deterministic setting is large, reaching values as
large as 158 $/MWh. Also note that the distortion (premia) is small and positive in nodes 1 and 6
and large and negative in the other nodes. This is inefficient because it biases incentives towards a
subset of players. The system is overly optimistic about performance in the real-time market where
multiple scenarios exhibit transmission congestion, but the deterministic setting cannot foresee
this. The stochastic formulation has almost the same expected social surplus as the deterministic
formulation, but the price distortion is eliminated.
In Table 4 we see that payments for both formulations are similar except for the 4th supplier,
which is a stochastic supplier. This supplier receives a negative payment and requires uplift under
deterministic clearing. The uplift is eliminated by using the stochastic formulation. The expected
payments collected with the stochastic here-and-now solution are close to those of the perfect
information solution.
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Table 4 System II. Comparison of suppliers and ISO revenues with deterministic and
stochastic formulations.
E[P gi (ω)] E[C
g
i (ω)] MISO
Deterministic {8529,33,627,−1398,24927} {8529,0,627,20,9640} -129111
Stochastic {8529,33,627,1903,27985} {8529,0,627,20,9640} -116885
Stochastic-WS {8458,37,570,1694,27714} {8458,0,570,20,9600} -117518
Table 5 System II. Day-ahead, quartiles of real-time quantities, and mean of
real-time quantities for suppliers.
∆αg,+i ∆α
g,−
i Quantity Gen 1 Gen 2 Gen 3 Gen 4 Gen 5
0.5∆αgi 1.5∆α
g
i gi 90 0 0 20 50
QGi(ω)(0.25) 90 0 0 20 50
E[Gi(ω)] 84.6 0.4 5.7 19.7 48
1.0∆αgi 1.0∆α
g
i gi 91.7 0 0 20.8 50
QGi(ω)(0.5) 91.7 0 0 20.8 50
E[Gi(ω)] 84.6 0.4 5.7 19.7 48
1.5∆αgi 0.5∆α
g
i gi 91.7 0 2.5 20.8 50
QGi(ω)(0.75) 91.7 0 2.5 20.8 50
E[Gi(ω)] 84.6 0.4 5.7 19.7 48
6.2.2. Convergence of Day-ahead Quantities: Quartiles vs. Means In Table 5 we
present the day-ahead quantities gi convergent to a quantile of the real-time quantities. The day-
ahead quantities gi with the quartiles (i.e., quantiles at p= 0.25,0.5,0.75) of the real-time quanti-
ties are compared with the means E[Gi(ω)] of the real-time quantities. Recall that QGi(ω)(0.5) =
M[Gi(ω)]. We use asymmetric incremental bid prices ∆αg,+i ,∆α
g,−
i as set in Table 5. As can be
seen, convergence is achieved for all suppliers.
6.2.3. Reliability Constraints We now consider the case in which there are random line
failures. We consider 25 scenarios and assume that each one of the lines 1→ 2, 2→ 6, 3→ 6,
4→ 6, and 2→ 3 fails in at least five scenarios. All scenarios have equal probability. The results are
presented in Table 6. The deterministic setting becomes revenue inadequate in this case, whereas
the stochastic setting is revenue adequate and achieves an expected ISO revenue that is close to that
of the perfect information setting. An average price distortion of 1,374 $/MWh and a maximum
distortion of 2,355 $/MWh were obtained for the deterministic setting, indicating a pronounced
effect of line failures on prices. In particular, we observed that several demands need to be curtailed
in the deterministic case. The stochastic formulation eliminates the distortion and the need for
uplift payments. Note also that the fourth wind supplier again faces a negative revenue under
deterministic clearing and an uplift payment is needed. This again illustrates that deterministic
clearing can affect resource diversification because it consistently biases the payments towards a
subset of players.
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Table 6 System II. Comparison of suppliers and ISO revenues with deterministic and
stochastic formulations under transmission line failtures.
E[P gi (ω)] E[C
g
i (ω)] MISO
Deterministic {88870,5,999,45196,63415} {2447,6,999,6,4240} 148311
Stochastic {1870,6,999,519,10296} {1870,6,999,5,3960} -39691
Stochastic-WS {1700,5,908,516,10287} {1700,5,908,4,3600} -39965
Table 7 IEEE-118 System. Comparison of suppliers and
ISO revenues with deterministic and stochastic formulations.
MU ϕg Mpiavg Mpimax MISO
Deterministic -151 36531 0.270 2.331 -2306
Stochastic 0 36527 0.001 0.003 -2009
Stochastic-WS 0 36410 0 0 -1982
6.3. IEEE-118 System
We now demonstrate the properties of the stochastic setting in a more complex network. The
IEEE-118 system comprises 118 nodes, 186 lines, 91 demand nodes, and 54 suppliers. We assume
that three stochastic suppliers are located at buses 10, 65 and 112, and that each supplier has
an installed capacity of 300 MWh. This represents 14% of the total generation capacity. We also
assume that a generation level for a given stochastic supplier follows a normal distribution with
mean 300 MWh and standard deviation 150 MWh. The total generation capacity is 7,280 MW,
and the total load capacity is 3,733 MW. We use sample average approximation and generate 25
scenarios for the stochastic suppliers. We use 10% of the generation cost for the incremental bid
prices ∆αgi . The demands are assumed to be deterministic, and we set ∆α
d
j = 0.001. We use the
penalty parameters ∆αf` = ∆α
θ
n = 0.001.
The results are presented in Table 7. The uplift payment and The price distortions exist for
the deterministic setting. The stochastic formulation reduces the uplift payments by a factor of
4 and eliminates the price distortion (Mpimax = 0.003). The difference in social surplus between
deterministic and stochastic formulations is marginal. Also note that the penalty parameters for
the flows and phase angles can be set to arbitrarily small values because they have no economic
interpretation. Consequently, they do not affect the social surplus significantly.
7. Conclusions and Future Work
We have demonstrated that deterministic market clearing formulations introduce strong and arbi-
trary distortions between day-ahead and expected real-time prices that bias incentives and block
diversification. We present a stochastic formulation capable of eliminating these issues. The formu-
lation is based on a social surplus function that accounts for expected costs and penalizes deviations
between day-ahead and real-time quantities. We show that the formulation yields day-ahead prices
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Table 8 System I solutions from primal simplex method
pin Πn(ω) E[Πn(ω)] E[P gi (ω)] MISO Mpimax
{9,1000,22}
Deterministic {10,20,20} {9,22,22} {9,347,21} {250,−7183,533} -8400 327
{9,18,18}
{10,22,22}
Stochastic {10,20,20} {11,20,20} {10,20,20} {250,967,533} -250 0
{9,18,18}
{10,1000,1000} {10,1000,1000}
Stochastic-WS {10,20,20} {10,20,20} {10,347,347} {250,9167,16833} -8417 NA
{10,20,20} {10,20,20}
that are close to expected real-time prices. In addition, we show that day-ahead quantities converge
to the quantile of real-time counterparts.
Future work requires extending the model in multiple directions. First, it is necessary to capture
the progressive resolution of uncertainty by using multi-stage models and to incorporate ramping
constraints and unit commitment decisions. Second, it is necessary to construct formulations that
design day-ahead decisions that approach ideal wait-and-see behavior. Morales et al. (2014) demon-
strate that this might be possible to do by using bi-level formulations, but a more detailed analysis
is needed. Third, the proposed stochastic model is computationally more challenging than existing
models available in the literature because it incorporates the detailed network in the first-stage.
This leads to problems that much larger first-stage dimensions which are difficult to decompose
and parallelize. Consequently, scalable strategies are needed. Finally, it is necessary to explore
implementation issues of stochastic markets such as effects of distributional errors.
Appendix. System I Solutions from Different LP Algorithms
Since System I problem is degenerate, multiple dual solutions are available. We report the solu-
tions of System I obtained from different LP algorithms. Tables 8 and 9 present the solutions from
primal simplex method and dual simplex method, respectively, from using CPLEX-12.6.1. Note
that we present the dual solutions (i.e., prices) only, since all the primal solutions (i.e., day-ahead
and real-time quantities) are identical. We also note that in all cases we have price converges. The
deterministic settings result in the positive price distortions.
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Table 9 System I solutions from dual simplex method
pin Πn(ω) E[Πn(ω)] E[P gi (ω)] MISO Mpimax
{9,1000,22}
Deterministic {10,20,20} {9,20,20} {9,346,20} {250,−7183,533} -8400 326
{9,18,18}
{10,22,22}
Stochastic {10,17,17} {10,20,20} {10,17,17} {250,767,533} -183 0
{11,10,10}
{10,1000,1000} {10,1000,1000}
Stochastic-WS {10,20,20} {10,20,20} {10,343,343} {250,8917,16833} -8333 NA
{10,10,10} {10,10,10}
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